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CHAPTER 1 
How Courts Came to Govern 
At 7:53 A.M. on December 7, 1941, Japanese bombers struck U.S. 
naval bases on Oahu, Hawaii, killing 2,403 U.S. military personnel 
~nd ~itizens. Not included in the offici~l casualty count but none- 
theless a victjm of the attack was an evil fellow named Jim C~w. 
World War 'II put soldiers of diverse skin colors in motion 
~r~,und the Country. Northern whites witnessed segregation in the 
'"~~~~~··.~d s~~ther~ blacks experienced 'the freer, but still deeply 
~a.~~?t~~~s ~f t~e North .. The blo~d they shed overseas was all 
~esJ~e c~l~~· The common enemy, Adolf Hitler, exemplified the 
~vii in the. ~laims of racial superiority that gave Jim Crow life. The 
, <~a.~.c~?ed ~t~<~uestion the governmentally imposed second-class 
.• !;·•;.~, iis ~f blac~fTue cultural tide was turning, as became clear when 
~niHff.'fyY,S. Trilman ended official segregation in the military 
. ou most southern whites still believed in segregation, they 
· t>n a colli.si<>n course with histor}'. Northern businesses, which 
'.the ii6n's share of the nation's investment funds, were. 
o mvest 1n the Deep Sou · eaving it an' economic back- 
10n was a1s0~·ilicr ly indefeifsible in the world 
rita~n ceded iifdependence to India in 1947, formally 
he'~.wll!t~ ~F's ~~~~i~~:::}~y;~ COid ~ar~f~~gg~e of 
· s'Wiili dieSoviet Unioh;JimCrow·was a dangerous 
U~itf<i States. . . · . 
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Segregation was doomed, but just when and how it would end 
was not foreordained. Nor was it fated that Thurgood Marshall and 
his colleagues working with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund would 
play the pivotal roles they did. 
Massive Resistance 
Marshall and others who mapped the litigation campaign to end 
school segregation began without power. The African Americans 
among them had been brought up in a society that threatened to 
lynch those who protested their subservient status. Nonetheless, 
they litigated throughout the South in the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
with no assurance that they would win. The only certainty was that 
they would have to bear daily indignities, such as having to eat their 
lunches huddled in a car because no restaurant would seat them. 
Finally, in the 1954 case of Brown v. Board of Education, the 
Supreme Court handed down the decision for which Marshall and 
his colleagues had so Jong striven,' The Court declared school segre- 
gation unconstitutional. It took <.;onsiderable courage for Chief Jus- 
tice Earl Warren and his colleagues on the bench to issue this unan- 
imous, politically charged, precedent-breaking decision . 
. Yet Brown itself made h"r~y a dent in segregation. Southern 
politicians launched a counterattack. Citing constitutional theories 
reversed by the Civil War, they claimed the right to disregard Su- 
. preme Court decisions -wi.th -which their white constituents dis- 
agreed.To keep African Americans out of the schools and "in their 
. place;' these officials organized what they termed "massive resis- 
tance:' They blocked schoolhouse doors, declaring, "Segregation 
today, segregation forever:' Sheriffs used cattle prods on peaceful 
demonstrators. Governors egged white mobs into action-and it 
appeared for a while that the mobs might -win- Some federal judges 
abetted the resistance; those who tried to enforce the law got only 
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grudging support from Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John 
F. Kennedy. For a while, the "massive resistance" threatened to nul- 
lify the Supreme Court's decision in Brown. 
Backlash in the South produced a counter-backlash in the rest of 
the nation. Television, a new force in American politics, brought 
the mobs defending "The Southern Way of Life" into America's liv- 
ing rooms. As Professor Alexander Bickel of Yale Law School wrote 
in 1962: 
Here were grown men and women furiously confronting their 
enemy: two, three, a half dozen scrubbed, starched, scared, and 
•.incredibly.brave colored children. The moral bankruptcy, the 
shame of the thing, was evident .. , . There was an unforgettable 
scene, for example, in one CBS newscast from New Orleans, of a 
white mother fairly foaming at the mouth with the effort to rivet 
'her distracted little boy's attention and teach him how to liate . 
. ~d repeatedly, the ugly spitting curse, NIGGER! The effect 
achieved on an unprecedented number of people with unprece- 
dented speed, must have been something like what used to hap- 
pen to individuals (the young Lincoln among them) at the sight 
· of an actual slave auction: ... Mob action led to the mobilization 
'C?,(n()ryhern opinion in support of the Court's decision-not 
f{ hll"l~rel}'.~.~5~1-1~«!. tll~ mob is disorderly, but because it concretized 
·M ~e abs~racfi<>ll of rac~.D"l· ... One of those supreme occasions 
. .. had beenbrought about when a decisive reprise is open to the 
p9litical.branches; it was for them to make the Court's decision 
their r.ule. c:>,fp9litiali action, or not to do so, and thus to. make or 
>.~f(!.~.~~~.~e~~~fon jt~elf. 'fhe! politi~ ~nmc~(!S ... had inde~C!ll.~ 
"'·~Yi,?n tliei~.9wn ~~ponsibility, to speak tlieir mora} ap: 
•c ... ··· va} of the Court's decision, to support it by drawin~ on their 
• •:own resources; and to act in pursuance of it. This was one time. 
;~hen hiding behind the judges' skirts would not do. The politi- 
institutions had a decision of their own to make. 2 
j·.e> ·.,;:· ... ··'·-':i/.''-··---:· .. _.,. __ ,_ .. ··.- _._ .. ,. ,.,_ • _,,_ ·-.··-.- ., .. _., 
ngress arid-the presidentjdecided in favor of equal rights be- 
.·. ctoraie shocked by. tlies~ ugly images, demanded it. 
. ey. beg enacting antisegr~ationist statutes with· teeth. 
f,passillg the ~uc~ .. insteadsofrtelling federal agencies to 
16 HOW COURTS CAME TO GOVERN 
pursue a melange of goals designed to please everyone-elected of- 
ficials straightforwardly outlawed the practices that kept African 
Americans out of schools and voting booths. To ensure that these 
new laws were obeyed, Congress gave the Department of Justice the 
authority, funding, and political backing it needed to sue in the 
name of the United States. The Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare was meanwhile instructed to cut off federal money to 
school districts that failed to desegregate. 
Brown v. Board of Education and the ten years of litigation that 
followed produced hardly any practical change in the field, but what 
Congress did beginning in 1964 brought massive change. 3 With 
Brown; the S~preme Court had, ., not so much imposed its values on 
society as called the questio11 of }Vhether Jim Crow should live on. 
Society answered by coming down decisively against racism. 
, Southern politicians hollered "states' rights:' This principle- 
that national government should stay out of the affairs of state and 
local. governments and that also goes by the name federalism-has 
validity burwas a loserxin the.context of desegregation. Federalism 
. . 
had never stopped federal judges from protecting other constitu- 
tioncll r.i~ts, al}.d the stipi:ehi~ 9Jtirt haldecid.ed that school segre- 
gation violated the Constitution. State elected officials who asserted 
states' rights were temporarily. popular in their own districts but 
were:so~n overwhelmed by.thesocial forces sweeping the country. 
Ame,rica i~ the end honc:>red ~ejtidg~)vho epforced desegregation 
, .. decrees a~ strong ancl wise. ~cl visionary. These assertive judges 
and the civil rights lawyers who appealed to them were the heroes of 
.the day. 
Yet federal courts did more than stop constitutional violations 
in· the desegregation cases. Ongoing resistance to compliance With 
the lawforced federal judges to undertake the policy-making work 
·~/·;· 
of school boards and, later, prison wardens. Understandably, the 
judges wanted the institutions under them to become not only leg· 
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but better. From the death of Jim Crow, there was thus born a 
revolutionary idea: that courts could and should reform state and 
local governments. 
Congress Cashes In 
The image of state and local officials as villains in need of judicial 
correction began with the South but spread to officials across the 
country during the era of antiwar demonstrations and urban riots. 
In the resulting culture, mayors and governors came to be consid- 
ered part of the problem rather than the solution. Local politics that 
set priorities through democratic tugging and hauling reflected, 
many young lawyers thought, the basest instincts of society. They 
Wanted to use the courts to improve society just as the he~oes of 
Brown had done before them. Marcia Lowry, who filed the Wilder 
case, was one of them. We were, too. 
In the late 1960s, with southern segregation on the run, the 
moral spotlight turned to poverty and the environment. Books such 
t'5 ~ichael Harrington's The Other America (1962) and Rachel Car- 
~on's Silent,Spring (1962) made the public aware that poverty and 
pollution, like. racial segregation, were the unfinished business of 
. !}ie·American dream. As with racial segregation, national leaders 
blam~d these failures on state and local officials . 
..... ·~gr~~ responded. to· these new challenges by creating statu- 
t<)ry rights enforceable in federal court against state and local gov- 
·.··~mments. Before Brown, -Congress had . created few such rights. 
''ngress,,to;be.sure,. h0d vastly .increased national•~e~~tfoh of 
, !.Pi$(!neral ,a,nd business in pa,rticular,. but it had largely.cex-' 
a ~~~i ~e!•<>et.goye~.~~~~···~rg~~e·~!!1eil1j~~l>0[~t~ti~.c>re 
.eatme11t.:T~e .• f~e[way·in)V~!c~.·.C911gr(!SS'inflpe11s.C!ci,state 
. cal g()\fernmentS,was by,giyipg'ih~ill\InODey \vitlj';§fl"fugs at- 
;; ,, ere j!l the·;m~i~··~iffi(!d·at get~g sl,ate:,a.id 
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local governments to spend the federal money for its intended use- 
highway money for highways, housing money for housing-and 
were not aimed at using the federal purse for regulating state and 
local governments. State and local officials sometimes complained 
that spending conditions were too complex or constricting, but en- 
forcement was generally by the federal agency, which might negoti- 
ate a plan to achieve eventual compliance but almost never would 
turn off the money tap. 
In addressing the civil rights challenge, Congress adopted a dif- 
ferent strategy. Faced with defiance from elected state and local offi- 
cials, Congress opted to act primarily.through federal agents, espe- 
cially U.S. marshals, federal voting inspectors, Department of Justice 
attorneys, and federal judges. Congress followed a similar pattern in 
President Lyndon B. Johnson's 1965 War on Poverty, in which federal 
officials worked directly with local poverty organizations rather than 
through existing state and municipal channels. This was the concept 
of maximum feasible participation, which.proved disastrous, as so 
brilliantly narrated in Daniel Patrick Moynihan's Maximum Feasible 
Misunderstanding. 4 
As the Voting Rights Act started to make states in the South more 
responsiv,~ to African Americans, Congress reverted to its more tra- 
ditional means of getting its way: it tied federal money to federal 
standards. This well-worn strategy had the great advantage of inter- 
posing states and cities as buffers between the federal government 
and the beneficiaries of the social programs and also allowed Con- 
gress to observe the niceties of federalism. 
Congress increasingly used spending conditions to regulate how 
states and cities ran programs that they had long funded and oper- 
ated on their own. Governors and mayors had little choice but to 
comply, as leaving federal .funds on the table would be political 
suicide. This fiscal federalism . or regulatory federalism, as it came 
to be called, was the tool by which the federal government im- 
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posed national standards on traditional state programs such as 
education, welfare, medical assistance, water quality, and highway 
construction. 5 
Although our topic is court management of state and local gov- 
ernments, not fiscal federalism, fiscal federalism is an ~ssential in- 
gredient in how courts came to govern. Fiscal federalism called for a 
new governmental lineup. The federal government assumed the sen- 
ior role of setting standards on how and when states and localities 
would deliver services. To get the federal money, governors and 
mayors had to promise to dance to the federal tune. 
But who would make sure that the governors and mayors deliv- 
ered on the promises they gave to secure the federal money? Answer: 
the courts. They stood at the ready. Judge Skelly Wright of the Dis- 
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals expressed in 1971 the spiri! of the 
times: "Our.duty, in short, is to see that important legislative pur- 
poses, heralded in the halls of Congress, are not lost or misdirected 
in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy'" 
Members of Congress, quick to perceive changes that work to 
their. advantage, latched on to the courts' willingness to supervise 
state and local governments as a way to crown themselves with the 
heroic mantel of rights-bestower, The prospect oflegislating popular 
generalities arid leaving them to be fleshed out by the courts was 
~pecially enticing. After all, what makes the work of elected politi- 
~iaris.hard-,--and makes reelection even harder-is the dash of inter- 
~~·2.F9r:. one example, those who want factories to reduce pollution 
clash with rnanagement;: shareholders, customers, and employees, 
all <if whom have an, interest in avoiding the expense of pollution 
~8.~tt"OL Politicians ·\.Vhodare enact rules resolving such dashes often 
u~~~~\.Vay f~eling that they mad.~more enemies than friends .. Jfthe 
~8~ff-~akin?.b~r~e~ were shiit~d to.~e.courts,.nation~J~islators 
f~¥1~·.hav~4:t~eir. ¢alee• and.eat it> to9.).They could .•. take.credit for 
··bestowing' rightsfwhile lawyers and judges forced state and .local 
officials to shoulder the blame for the costs. The state and local 
officials would have to impose the higher taxes, tougher regula- 
tions, or service cuts needed to comply with the federal mandates. 
This ploy came to be .known among political types as the unfunded 
mandate. 
Starting with the 1970 Clean Air Act, Congress gave everyone a 
right to healthy air. Who had the corresponding duty to cleanit was 
not specified. 7 The federal lawmakers passed that buck to the elected 
branches of state and local government by setting up an elaborate 
process in which state and local officials would have to decide who 
had to reduce their emissions and how much. To deflect the charge 
that.this new right to dean air was not just hot air, the act authorized 
citizens to sue in court. The courts, not-Congress, became the place 
where .dean air policy would be made. 8 
The state and local officials were not to blame for the dirty air, or 
no more to blame than Congress, but that was beside the point. 
Congress acted as if state and local officials were to . blame, even 
though state and.local officials had already done far more to reduce 
pollution from factories than the.federal government had done or 
would do in the next.decade," On the the?ry imported from the civil 
rights desegregation model that states and cities failed the . people, 
Congress, in the words of the Supreme.Court, took."a stick to the 
Stat~",in the 1970 Clean Air Act.J0 
. The. opportunity for .. political profit-was irresistible. Legislators 
began to make names for themselves .by searching out appealing 
causes and then turning them. irito statutory rights enforceable in 
federal court against state and focal government. As former New 
York City Mayor EdwardL.Koch explained why he, as a.member of 
Congress, had voted to create-a.right .to.public.transportation for 
people with disabilities: "I voted for that. You'd be crazy to be against 
that. When you are a member of Congress ahd you are voting a 
mandate and not providing the funds for it, the sky's the limit,"!' 
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Thus, from the mid-iseos to the end of the 1970s, Congress went 
from regulating state and local governments hardly at all to regu- 
lating them in detail. The list of exactions imposed since the 1970s 
is staggering, as Figure 1.1 indicates. In statutes enacted between 
1970 and 1991, Congress preempted more states' laws than it had 
from 1789 to 1969.12 A federal commission concluded in 1996 that 
more than 200 separate federal mandates involving 170 federal laws 
reached "into every nook and cranny of state and local activities,"!" 
A study of reported federal court decisions for the year 1994 found 
that more than 3,500 judicial opinions arose under more than 100 
separate federal laws involving state and local governments.14 An- 
other study found steady growth of special education litigation fol- 
lo'!ing passage of the federal statute in 1975.15 Public policy issues 
that had once been decided in the political branches, mostly.at the 
state and local levels, were now affected, if not controlled directly, by 
federal rights enforceable in federal courts. 
This mass production of rights became possible because of a 
$e~ies of basic structural changes in American politics. For one, the 
i.x-~.:;.~en~te no longer protected the states .. Before adoption of the 
I§(!yenteenth Amendment to the Constitution, ratified in 1913, U.S .
. ~~at~isw~re ~iec1:ed by state legislatures, not the voters directly. The 
;o~~ systemJo_r,el,ecting senators, whatever its defnerits, tended to 
~~~t.~~t s~t~<l.!}d local governments from the predations qf officials 
,, ~~h~gt()!}· ' 
.vf.l~~'~.2~~~~~cl~ disappeared .'Vith the New De~\.The S~greme 
.. ·~Prt.ha~·'f5~f.l~ly stopped Congress fromexteriding i~ reac~ 
b~y()nd po~ers 'enumerated in the Constitution such as providmg · 
~~~~.~~;~.ff0nse, regitlating .interstate c°,mmerc0is?•~ ~~~?re~ 
tituti~pal rights~ f~ustt;ategJ>y narrow int~rv~e!'lti()ps -of 
Nine Statutes 
Davis-Bacon Act ( 1931) 
Hatch Act (I 'MO) 
No Statutes 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(Tide VI) 
Water Quality Act 
Highway Beautification Act 
of 1965 
National Historic Preser- 
vation Act of 1966 
Wholesome MeatAct 
(1967) 
Architectural Barriers Act 
of 1968 
Civil Rights Act of 1968 
(Tide VIII) 
Wholesome Poultry 
Products Act ( 1968) 
National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969 
Two Statutes 
Through the 1940s 1950s 1960s 
Figure 1.1. Major federal statutes regulating state and local governments. 
(See the appendix for descriptions of the statutes and methodology.) 
·Twenty-five Stawtes 
Occupational Safety and 
Health Act ( 1970) 
Clean Air Act Amendments 
of 1970 
Uniform Relocation Act of 
1970 
Equal Employment Oppor- 
tunity Act of 19n 
Edueation Amendments of 
197_2 (Title IX) 
federal Watl!r Pollution 
Control Act Amend- 
ments Of 19n 
federal. Insecticide, fungi- 
cide, and Rodenticide 
,Act(l9n) 
N.ational Health Planning 
and Resources De.el- 
. opmentAct Of 1974 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
Endangered Species Act of 
.,i973· 
Adocl Disasrer Pn>tection 
• ""ctpf 1~73/ i 
Emergency HighW.ly 
~rgy Conservation Act (1974f" ••. 
f':8e,J?iscriinination ... in 
'iJniploymentAct (1974)' 
~k .~ Standards Act 
'"Amendments of 1974 · 
~!ly Education Rights ... 
·crlm<i!'rMc:YActof 191.J 
~.··· ... · Dn··.n·· .• ··ki· ·.·· .. ng· ....Wa··· .. ····· .. ·ter A:..ct .. of ... ··. ?·1915•·1,,·· \"'i/'' ' .·. • 
~ Discrimination Act of 
t;\1.975 i!J.•!'•~i'.:71'''"iii•· ..
Ed1.1cation for All Handi- Sfappe.i ·Chi1dn.n Act t 
(1975) .. ( ''... ·'' Coast31 Zone l".13iiagement 
·'· Actof,19n ~eSourte; Conservation· .. 
Reicovery Act of 
7<-'< 
Twenty-one Statutes 
Voting Rights Act Amend- 
ments of 1982 
Surface Transportation 
Assistance Act of 1982 
Social Security Amend- 
ment$ of 1983 
Highway Safety Amend- 
ments of 1984 
Voting Accessibility for the 
8derly and Handicapped 
Act (1984) 
Child Abuse Amendments 
of 1984 . .. 
Hazardous and Solid Waste 
Amendments of 1984 
Consolidated Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1985 
Handicapped Children's 
Protection Act of 1986 
Safe Drinking Wati!r Act 
· Arriendmems· of 1986 
Education of the Handi- 
c:ipped Act Amendments 
of 1986 
Emergency Planning and 
Community Right-to- 
KriO..V Act of 1986 
Asbestos Hazard Emer- 
geiiCy .Response Act of 
1986 
cOmmerc..l MotorVehide 
Safety Act of 1986 
Age DisO:irnination i!l 
EmploymentActAwend- 
;; ments ofJ 986,/'c f • 
Water Qua&ty Act of 1987 
Gvil Right$- Rest0rat:i!)n 
Actofl987 v.. - 
Drug-Free Workplace Act 
of 1988"' ... ": • 
Fair l;:lousing.ActAmend- · 
&'. rileiiis or 1988 . ... v,/ • 
Lead Coiltam.!nation".,,;. 
c:1:ontrC>J.ACi'(,f 1988·.·· 
Ocean DUmpiiig Ban ActfF 
Jtn198S>li110z;g&1:.::c'· 
Twenty-one Statutes 
Americans with Disabilities 
Act (1990) 
Cash Management Im- 
provement Act of 1990 
Oean Air Act Amendments 
of 1990 
Education of the Handi- 
capped Act Amendments 
of 1990 
Older Workers Benefit 
Protection Act of 1990 
Social Security: Fiscal 1991 
Budget Reconciliation 
Act . '' 
Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act Amend- 
. ments of 1991 
lntermodal Surface Trans- 
portation Efficiency Act 
of 1991 
Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention 
Amendments of 1992 
Rehabilitation Act Amend- 
ments of 1992 
Family and Medical leave 
Act of 1993 
National Voter Registration 
Act of 1993 
Brady Handgun Violence 
Prevention Act of 1993 
Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993 
Improving America's 
Schools Act of 1994 
Safe Dr;inking Water Act· 
Amendments of 1996 
Personal J\esponsibility · 
andWork Oppor;tunity 
., Reco!lciliati9!l t.ci'of' · 
1996 ... .. . • 
Adoption and Safe. FaJJ!il~ 
Act,1997 
lmtivlduals.•Wit!:i ... Oisabilities 
Ediicai:ionActAmend- ·· Fo=~.:~~~~~- 
.;Act of .;I 999;:riiJii•••f•" ,,· 
TiCke(ro yyart(and vvork 
.,-Jnce~lm~ntJ sA.a·o. 1 m·:'12W<'i''"''" : 
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Congress, however, did not mass-produce mandates against state x 
and local governments until the 1970s because the argument that··~ 
Washington should stick to truly national issues continued to have ( 
political force. That argument fell into disfavor after southern segre- ·~ 
gationists invoked states' rights for an ugly purpose. .. 
NationaI political parties had also protected state and local gov- •. 
ernments by knitting federal legislators, governors, and mayors ': 
from the same political party into close coalitions. After Watergate 
and the resignation of President Richard M. Nixon in 1974, political .. 
parties lost much of their power. Just as presidential politics have '1: 
changed, S() too have congressional .politics. Working one's way up J'. 
the party hierarchy is no longer the only path to status in Congress. 'J 
Many legislators make 'names for themselves by searching out ap- . 
pealing causes and turning them into statutory rights enforceable · 
against state and local officiais in federal court. 
State and local governments were slow to oppose federal man- ' 
dates, and when they did they often failed. Paul L. Posner, in his : 
study ()(unfunded mandates, .. explained why.16 National interest 1 
groups often have more influence and relevance to the ambitions of'i 
membersof Congress than do officials from their own state. When · 
issues erupt, enthtisiasm for action sweeps ovt;r Congress, exciting i 
poli!~<;al entrepreneurs to make the iss11e their. own. Advocates for: .. 
the, llew initiative emphasize !?.enefits and hide costs. State and local ··• 
officials cannot easily oppose ~~w federal programs aimed at helping 
constit\le~ts,~~d may ~~~~~~.~~=opt;~ into supporti11ga mandate 
·,in order toget a larger share of federal funds. Even when some 
opposemandates.fhey have little success because the price of man- 
datesis paid by everyone and therefore is the particular concern 
no. op~: The national media a.}s() wor!cagainst state and local opposi- 
tion to mandates. Television especially hasthe capacity to universal- 
ize current ideas and to make famous Those political leaders seeking 
to creat~1~ational standards. In addition, until recently, most mem- 
How Courts Came to Govern 25 
hers of the media grew up during the civil rights era and came to 
believe that the assumptions of that period were universally applica- 
ble to all policy issues. They are swept along with everyone else. 
The Rise of Public Interest Law 
Every spring in the half century since Brown v. Board of Education, 
many of the thousands of new law school graduates begin their legal 
careers dreaming of becoming heroes asserting rights in court or 
creating them in Congress. We ourselves felt these aspirations. One 
of us (Schoenbrod) began his legal career as a law clerk for one of the 
heroes who argued Brown in the Supreme Court, Judge Spottswood 
W. Robinson III. Both of us worked in the 1970s as public interest 
attorneys in one of the premier advocacy organizations, the Natural 
Resources Defense Council. 
Publicinterest attorneys were near cousins of civil rights attor- 
neys such as Thurgood Marshall. We sought changes that went be- 
yond constitutional rights such as freedom of speech. Our work 
extended to all social concerns, from poverty and the environ- 
ment to .: prisons, consumerism, women's -rights, education, and 
health benefits. We would stand up to landlords, big corporations, 
and municipal ~fficials. Public interest attorneys sought to provide 
legai,representation to interests that historically had been under- 
Je~f.~ented.17 
p;•;,~~ecialty law centers sprouted up. When Brown v. Board ofEdu- 
. (;Qtion was decided, the only cause-oriented lawyer groups were 
.. ,the~erican Civil Liberties Union and the NAACP Legal.Defense 
F~n~PBtiilding on.these models; the Ford Foundation fundedthe 
~- ~~~~[J~t3SI1izabl•e .•. public: in!~restla\\fcfirm, a community 3ffice in 
~~~J~av~n~~nn~cticut, in1196J.-'fhat~ame:yeara similat" organi- 
~~~nn¥~~~tionfornYou:!11,· ·setup.·•·s~op .on: New0York\City's 
•. Lower East S~de. Favorable ~ublicity for these two new groups-and 
26 HOW COURTS CAME TO GOVERN 
support from the organized bar-led to the creation of the federal 
legal services program as part of President Johnson's W~r on Pov- 
erty. By 1967, the Office of Economic Opportunity had funded three 
'~ j 
hundred local legal services organizations and a dozen national law 
reform centers to focus on test cases and legislative change in par- 
ticular areas such as education, health, consumer law, housing, wel- 
fare, and economic development.18 Private, nongovernmental pub- 
lic interest law firms also appeared, among them the Environmental 
Defense Fund, the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Center 
for Law and Social Policy, the Children's Defense Fund, Public Advo- 
cates, and the New York City Legal Aid Society's Prisoners' Rights 
Project. Critical to the growth of these centers was the fact that the 
Internal.Revenue Service decided in 1971 that public interest liti- 
gation was a charitable activity.deserving tax-exempt status. This 
brought money and legitimacy.19 Although public interest law con- 
tinued to cause controversy, it had become part of the legal terrain. 
The new federal standards for states and localities empowered us 
and our public interest colleagues. Federal statutes and federal regu- 
lations allowed recentJawschool graduates to steamroll statehouses 
and municipal councils throughout the land. 
Our power dependedon our ability to enforce the standards in 
federal.courtzIf enforcement.were.solely by federal agencies and not 
also by federal COUrts,L tl,:ie agencies could bend 'the Standards in 
response to political pre,ssure,brought by mayors and governors. We 
insisted instead on rights enforceable in court by us.;D<:segregation 
. was always the analogy. With public interest attorneys on the case 
and thedoo~s to the federal courthouse open, what ought to be done 
would be done, or so wexargued.'Politically, this translated to a 
demand that the public interest bar be accepted as «private attorneys 
general" to enforce federal laws whenever the federal government 
failed to do the job. We in .the public interest bar amended the 
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pyramidal relationships first envisioned by Congress. Under our 
amendment, the federal government remained as regulator on the 
top setting the standards, with states and localities at the bottom 
mandated to comply with the federal standards. In the middle, how- 
ever, as the chief enforcers of the standards, would be the private 
"public interest" attorney. 
The demand that private attorneys be given public power was 
most famously answered in the citizen suit provision first incorpo- 
rated ~the Clean Air Act of 1970. As proposed, the act would have 
made federal officials solely responsible for assuring that the states 
complied with federal standards. This did not sit well with environ- 
mentalists and led to discussions between David Sive, a founder of 
the environmental public interest bar, and Tim Atkinson, general 
counsel to President Nixon's Council on Environmental Quality, 
The'environmentalists of the era analogized environmental rights to 
constitutional rights. They drafted a proposed amendment to the 
Glean Air Act that allowed private citizens to enforce federal stan- 
r~af(.ls~nd,ifsuccessful, to win court-awarded attorneys' fees paid by 
~eJoser.·~is citizen suit provision was inserted into the pending 
~ill and passed Congress without attracting much attention. Similar 
Citizen suit provisions were later inserted in succeeding environ- 
•. m~ntal'statutes as well as many nonenvironmental statutes, such as 
th~"At,nencans with Disabilifies'Act, 
''J'li~·'citizensuitprovi:;ion in its many forms created a powerful 
·:;!?.?hthat li~~d uvo of the most P?!ent ideals inrthe :American 
• canon: (1) the right of the individual fo lawful treatment by govern- 
•. :ll1~nt·and (2) -the .moral authority of courts to condemn illegality. 
··· ~~~sF'n()~le:~~ea!f g()t~~!L~e~igr,e.~ in ~e'~~f~~c~~.~~t of 
tltutional rights~·th~l~slators!n••Congress nowhad lJ.Wayto 
duce statutory riSh 
icmal l~gislatorsb 
ainst states~ahd·localitie5: In this 
heroes; so did federal judges arid 
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public interest attorneys. Heroes in Congress proclaimed new rights, 
hero-judges enforced the new rights against the law-breaking state 
and local officials, and hero-attorneys guarded the new rights. 
The Courts Go with the Flow 
:',,.;, 
There was a time as late as the mid 1970s when it was still doubtful 
whether judges would assume managerial control of government 
programs except when necessary to remedy egregious violations of 
civil rights. In our careers at the Natural Resources Defense Council, 
we saw the courts move from reluctance to enthusiastic embrace of 
their new role. In the early 1970s, we sometimes lost cases because 
judges felt that it was inappropriate for private plaintiffs to micro- 
manage state and local governments. By the end of the 1970s, we 
were winning these cases and negotiating lengthy consent decrees 
that bind such governments to this day. 
Take, for example, our own efforts to improve the mass transit 
system In.New YorkCity. Our first efforts began with a 1973 noise 
pollution lawsuit brought in the name of children trying to learn in 
an elementary school adjacent to an elevated subway track. We asked 
the rrransit Authority to reduce subway noise so that children.could 
learn and employees and riders would not suffer hearing loss. The 
state high court·. dismissed our suit;~0 That .noise ·standards were 
yiolated was besidecthe point; the judges ruled, because courts 
could not .. correct: the<yiolatipns without enmeshing themselves 
in publictadministration, The decision-which, at the time, we 
thought wrong=was one of the last times that New York State courts 
stuck to the traditional concept that they should not control policy. 
But subway: noisei·WaS onlyjone symptom of a deeper crisis. 
Public transit . was. fighting a losing ·battle against the private car. 
Cities had failed to maintain their transit systems, and the systems 
were falling apart. Unwilling to raise fares, to postpone union wage 
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increases, or to raise taxes, politicians held down costs by "deferring" 
maintenance. Although cities sought help from Washington, Con- 
gress never delivered much for public transportation. 
Congress, however, had promised dean air-and auto conges- 
tion produced pollution. Here was a legal hook, which propo- 
nents of public transit could'use to regain the initiative. If subways 
ran better, fewer people would drive cars; less traffic would mean 
cleaner air. 
New York took the right to dean air seriously. Governor Nelson 
A. Rockefeller and Mayor John V. Lindsay agreed on a dean air plan 
that included. bridge tolls to fund transit improvements, But the 
officials who succeeded Rockefeller and Lindsay hesitated to impose 
tolls because tolls would be unpopular with motorists. 
Relying on Congress's declaration that citizens· had a right to 
clean air, we decided that we would be the ones who would enforce 
that right in the New York courts. In 1975 we went to federal court in 
1v.{anhattan to force the state and city to implement the dean air 
plan, ,including tolls. U.S. District Court Judge Kevin T. Duffy re- 
fused to enter an injunction on the grounds that it would enmesh 
him in public policy decisions thatshould be left to elected officials. 
We appealed to the court of appeals to discipline Judge Duffy by 
·ordering him to enforcei,!}le law. The appeals court ordered him to 
do so>" pointing out that Congrt1s had expressly given citizens a right 
~(j ~citthy air and had specifically alithorized citizens to vindicate 
~()lations 'of that, right in federal court. Judge . Walter·· Mansfield 
~ote ~at "Congress made dear that citizen groups are not to be 
treated as nuisances -or troublemakers but rather as welcomed par- 
t~cipants in the vindication of environme11tal interest5:'21 
·t,;~,Si}Vhat happ~J1.ed nm was an exerd~ej? P~fepolitks: Legislators, 
~h() had b~~n ~.~ytoo happy.to anno~ce a general right.to dean 
~fr;.backed 'offwhen they heard complaints from constituents/judge 
' .... ', ' ~ .. 
·P11ffy's decision J:ia<l: shown that Congress was, the ultimate source <lf 
the bridge-toll requirement. Once that became clear, the city's repre- 
sentatives in Washington wrote tolls out of the Clean Air Act. Led 
by Daniel Patrick Moynihan in the Senate and Elizabeth Holtzman 
in the House, Congress outlawed both our lawsuit and Governor 
Rockefeller's decision favoring tolls. When we asked the congressio- 
nal leaders how the state should meet Congress's clean air standards 
without bridge tolls, they would not say, 
The legislators in Washington usually escape personal blame for 
the consequences of the rights they impose because the costs o 
honoring rights typically fall on the public generally and not some 
discrete group such as those who commute into Manhattan by car. 
Consequently, legislators rarely reconsider the rights they bestow. 
That leaves the courts free to enforce the rights as originally enacted. 
With the supreme legislature in the land positively commanding the 
courts to lead the way, many judges marched forward into policy 
making, and did so openly, even self-righteously, The assumption, 
borrowed from the days of massive resistance to school desegrega- 
tion, was that if state or local government failed to honor the new 
rights, the reason had to be official resistance.> But official resis- 
tance seldom is the cause. Unlike the officials in the old South who 
resisted the goal of desegregation because their white constituent 
opposed it, state and local officials toda~;favor the goals of the ne 
rights because their constituents support them. The problem for th 
officials and for the courts is'lliat the same constituents often oppose 
the measures needed to translate the goals into reality. 
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Seeds of Doubt . 
Lawyers'today have grown up in a culture believing that many of the 
improvements that people want come only through judicially en- 
forceable rights. But long before democracy by decree, citizen advo- 
cates' and public officials worked for reform in other ways. They 
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organized, petitioned, voted, testified, and appealed to public opin- 
ion and state and local legislatures. 
Believers in democracy by decree argue that political progress is 
not fast enough or cannot be trusted. We thought the same when we 
· were public interest lawyers, but we were wrong. Looking back, we 
see that our own accomplishments came chiefly from politics as 
usual, not democracy by decree. 
Our court victories did little to clean the air, and our successes 
were mostly at the sufferance of society. Although we lost the subway 
noise lawsuit in the courts. of law, we ultimately won_ through poli- 
tics. The worst of the noise came from flat spots on subway car 
wheels. Once a steel wheel gets even a little out of round, the wheel 
skids on the flat spot whenever the brakes are applied, making the 
flat spot larger .. Without proper maintenance, the enlarged flat spots 
hang like hammers when the train runs at normal speed. Our law- 
suit was rejected, but the political pressures we set in motion forced 
politiCians to find ways to bring the wheels back into round. 
Congress got. rid of the bridge tolls, hut, working with Mayor 
Koch, the City Planning Department, and the Transit Authojity, we 
Pllhlished a.bOok in 1978, A New Direction in Transit, that showed 
h~w to make the transit system reliable.23 All New York newspapers 
endorsed our plan; which laid the groundwork for the state to de- 
_velop a series of capital programs that over time largely transformed 
}lil~~;'Y~~kCity's public transportation system ata cost so far of more 
thaJ1 $20 billion. 
Our. Clean Air Act victories in the courtroom produced very 
little improvement in air quality, The lengthy court ~rders tilti~ately 
~fl1posed on.NewYork City regulated how it assigned police, con- 
t~~~~d·~~affic; and permitted the operation of parkinglotsrhut in 
< ~~neral only marginally affected air quality. 
We had aspired -to be. like· Thurgood Marshall. -Instead •. of the 
'constjtutional right of.equality that Marshall fought.for, werelied on 
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the congressionally declared right _to clean air. The federal courts 
backed us with orders and favorable decisions, including one from 
Marshall himself sitting as the circuit justice. After a memorable 
argument in his chambers in the Supreme Court building in Wash- 
ington, Justice Marshall· wrote a decision denying Mayor Abra- 
ham D. Beame's request to stay Judge Duffy's toll order pending an 
opportunity for the mayor to present the city's case to the full Su- 
preme Court. The city never needed that hearing, however, because 
Congress eliminated the city's. bridge-toll requirement that same 
summer. 
The public interest bar oversells the ability of courts to reform 
society. People are prone to mistake the doings of heroes, including 
the heroes of Brown v. Board of Education, for the whole of history. 
As Leo Tolstoy wrote in. War and Peace, "in historic events, the so- 
called great men are labels giving names to events and like labels they 
have but the smallest connexion with the event itself:'24 Tolstoy 
was arguing that the French invasion of Russia in 1812 was not 
caused by the great men on the scene-Emperor Napoleon and Czar 
Alexander--but rather had "myriads of causes": "The deeper we 
delve in search of these causes the more of them we find; and each 
separate cause or whole series of causes appears to us equally valid in 
itself and equally false by its insignificance compared to the magni- 
tude .. of the-events. ;• .•. The .actions.of Napoleon and Alexander, on 
whose words the ev~nt seeme:~to hang, were as little voluntary as the 
actions of any soldier.who was drawn into the campaign by lot or by 
conscription ... ; The higher a man stands on the social ladder, the 
more people he is connected with and the more power he has over 
others, ihe more evident is the predestination and inevitability of his 
every acticm??25 
Similarly, the prime causes of the death of Jim Crow were not the 
heroesras heroic as they were; but the forces that led .society to want 
. to extirpate that disease from . the body politic. The courts played 
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a vital role. Brown v. Board of Education forced society to decide 
whether it wanted to honor its higher principles. When society an- 
swered "yes;' courts were needed to impose remedies on recalcitrant 
. officials, such as the governors who blocked the schoolhouse door. 
Yet, on balance, the courts rode the wave of history rather than 
set it in motion. Seen from this broader perspective, the heroism in 
the courthouse is no less heroic, but of a different nature. Thurgood 
·Marshall, Earl Warren, and their colleagues did not command their 
country to stop segregation, but they did diagnose the. disease and 
recommend a cure. In the end, the cure came from society, not from 
the courts. Judge Spottswood Robinson told one of us not long 
before he died: "We weren't the heroes. The heroes were our clients. 
We came and went, but they had to stay and face the intolerance 
everyday:' 
The basic premise of democracy by decree is that government 
can be made more compassionate only if judges impose their will 
on elected officials. Although dubious on many scores, that asser- 
tion has popular appeal precisely because most people want a com- 
P<t.SSionate government. The same voters elect both the rrrembers · 
(}f Congres5 and state and local governmental officials. Why then 
~~ould the federal officials be the more compassionates. 
. The battle to overthrow segregation is.not the right model for all 
T.~~~rrelati()11ships between federal and state and local officials. By 
~~~P.f>!~tin& ~~t battle to a whole host of newly minted rights, we 
~~~~-f~~~l,-~~ a,pew g()verqmental lineup in which one set of officials 
.. . e f;deralJev~l largely escapes accountability for the costs of the 
...... ••'••' $fi,ey p~~ and a9other setof officials at the state and local levels 
.!a~).<S\'!;be_po}!er .!() balance the costs of implementing the federal 
~irx.ngli!s ~gai11~t other .. coJI1peting priorities .. Perhaps federal 
;·sllouldjmposemandates on state andlocal governments.26 
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ll()!,.~.qu~~tion we address. Our.focus is on what happens in 
'Sb~.;,furenty~firstcentury after Congress has spoken and judges are 
asked to empower a controlling group to manage and supervise 
institutions of state or local government. 
Congress, whatever the limits ultimately imposed under the fed- 
eral Constitution, should be sensitive to the consequences of the 
mandates it proposes. It does not have to be, however, because of 
democracy by decree. Through democracy by decree, the courts 
exonerate the politicians in Washington from blame for the messes 
they create by commandeering state and local governments and 
thereby assuming the power to make policy. 
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